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I. AVOIDING A CONTRACT ON ACCOUNT OF NON-CONFORMITY
WITH TENDERED GOODS
The rules regarding the prerequisites for avoidance of sales
contracts due to non-conformity of the goods-referred to in the
Birgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) [hereinafter
BGBI as rescission (Ricktritt), previously cancellation
(Wandelung)-are difficult and have been the object of interna-
tional controversy in uniform sales law.'
There are, in particular, three interests to be considered
and weighed against each other in the avoidance of a sales con-
tract due to non-conformity of the goods, especially due to de-
fects in the quality of goods. The buyer has an interest that the
threshold for avoidance be as low as possible, so that in the
event of non-conformity of the goods he can readily get out of
t M.C.L. (Univ. of Chicago). D. Jr., Drs. honoris causa. Professor Emeritus,
Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg, Germany. The translation of this text is by
Todd Fox.
1 The following tentative considerations are part of a collection of essays to
be published in 2006 in honor of an eminent German scholar.
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the contract. The old BGB, with its remedy of cancellation that
could always be claimed as long as the "reduction in value or
fitness" of the goods caused by the defect was not "immaterial"
(§ 459 (1) BGB old version), acknowledged this interest. The
new version of the BGB, through the reform of the Law of Obli-
gations, retained the materiality threshold (§ 23 (5) BGB), but
with the precedence of claims for cure and the corresponding
possibility of a second tender, it strengthened the position of the
seller. Such a tender would under the new BGB, however, gen-
erally only occur in the form demanded by the buyer. (§ 439 (1),
(3) BGB). The possibility of salvaging the contract through a
"second tender" conforming to the contract (this being the sec-
ond interest to consider) is granted to the seller, who is thereby
provided a "second chance."2 The third interest to be considered
and weighed is costs of unwinding the contract, and it is espe-
cially important with sales requiring shipment to the buyer.
This interest is not clearly ascribed to buyer or seller as such,
but rather depends upon the system for restitution: avoidance
of a contract that the seller has already partially or fully per-
formed, a situation that makes return shipment of the goods
necessary and often requires temporary storage as well.
This creates costs and can increase the risks of loss and
damages. Who finally bears these costs and risks depends on
the various circumstances of the individual case and the differ-
ing rules (responsibility for breach of contract and the corre-
sponding liability to pay damages; responsibility for restitution
and the risk of loss). Undoing the deal in such cases (where
shipment is involved) can make the whole transaction more ex-
pensive and is often cited as the explanation for why the CISG,
with its requirement of "fundamental breach," sets the thresh-
old for avoidance of the contract due to non-conforming goods
much higher than the BGB. 3 Another reason the CISG's
2 Still the seminal work, see HANS GROIIMANN-DOERTH, DIE RECHTSFOLGEN
VERTRAGSWIDRIGER ANDIENUNG, (1934) [his explanations, particularly pages 191-
193, likely influenced Ernst Rabel in the drafts and texts of the Uniform Sales
Laws]. See also Ulrich Huber, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT art.
48 para. 5 n.6 (Ernst von Caemmerer & Peter Schlechtriem eds., 1990).
3 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [German Supreme Court] Hamburg No. VIII ZR
51/95, 3 Apr. 1996 (F.R.G.) at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcases/960403gl.html
(stating that contract avoidance and restoration are to be restrained); see also Pe-
ter Schlechtriem in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (CISG), art. 25, para. 21a (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg
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threshold is so high-and according to the decisions of the
Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) almost insur-
mountable-is because the CISG provision concerning a seller's
breach of contract by delivery of non-conforming goods does not
provide for a compromise between the avoidance interest of the
buyer and the interest of the seller in a second chance by way of
an extension of time, which (as in the case of a total failure to
deliver) would put the buyer in a position to set an additional
period of time for the cure of the non-conformity, and after its
expiration to avoid the contract. That means that the buyer
must also accept and retain defective goods that have not yet
been delivered, even when the defects become known before de-
livery (but after formation of the contract) and the costs and the
risks from the return shipping could not be triggered at all.
In the Anglo-American realm, the rule that the buyer must
accept non-conforming goods meets with particular resistance
and incomprehension, since the so-called "perfect tender rule,"
which is considered a commercial axiom and allows the buyer to
reject the goods due to a (but not every) lack of conformity to the
contract, 4 does not apply within the sphere of application of the
CISG. In England, this is viewed as one of the reasons for not
ratifying the CISG5 and in American writing as a motive to con-
tractually exclude application of the CISG.6
Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Schlechtriem COMMENTARY]; CISG-AC
(Advisory Council on the CISG) Opinion No. 5 (May 7, 2005) (Rapporteur
Schwenzer). It appears that the cost argument against easy avoidance of the con-
tract due to non-conformity was first brought into the discussion by Honnold: see
John Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection - A Study in the Impact of Codification
on a Commercial Problem, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1949).
4 See MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS para. 3.24 (1999);
Alistair Mullis, Avoidance for Breach under the Vienna Convention; A Critical
Analysis of Some of the Early Cases, in ANGLO-SWEDISH STUDIES IN LAW 326-55
(Mads Andenas & Nils Jarborg eds., 1998) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/biblio/mullisl.html. Regarding the "perfect tender rule," see also CISG-
AC Opinion No. 5, para. 2.2 (May 7 2005) (Rapporteur Schwenzer) available at
http://www.CISG-online.ch/cisg/cisgac/html.
5 See Mullis, supra note 4.
6 See Tom McNamara, U.N. Sale of Goods Convention: Finally Coming of
Age?, 32 COLO. LAw. 11-12, 17, 19-20 (2003), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.
edu.
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Compared to the CISG, its precursor, the Uniform Law for
the International Sale of Goods (ULIS),7 allowed avoidance of
the contract or rejection of defective goods under relaxed condi-
tions, though not always to the extent of the perfect tender rule
or § 459 (2) of the old BGB. In particular, Art. 44(2) ULIS pro-
vided that the buyer could fix an additional period of time for
the remedying of defects as well; and (hardly practicable) Art.
43 ULIS permitted avoidance when non-conformity and delay
represented fundamental breaches and were cumulated.8 Thus,
avoidance was allowed when a defect was fundamental but ca-
pable of subsequent cure, but that could no longer be remedied
within the agreed-upon time for delivery.9 Such could be the
case for transactions calling for performance at a fixed time, for
transactions with seasonal goods, or particularly in the interna-
tional commodity trade with prices listed on the commodity ex-
change: 10 it is in those cases where the deviation of the CISG
from internal sales law has been especially criticized in Anglo-
American writing.
The drafters of the CISG expressly rejected the eased re-
strictions on avoidance found in the ULIS: in 1973 the UNCI-
TRAL Working Group proposed the elimination of Art. 44(2)
and Art. 43 ULIS, 11 and in the Geneva Draft of 1976 the current
7 In German, the Einheitliches Gesetz iuber den internationalen Kauf beweg-
licher Sachen, [Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods], 1973 BGB1. II at
892 (F.R.G.), commonly known as the Hague Uniform Sales Law.
8 "The buyer may declare the contract avoided if [both] the failure of the
goods to conform to the contract and also the failure to deliver on the date fixed
amount to fundamental breaches of the contract." Art. 43 ULIS.
9 See Herbert Stumpf in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT art. 43,
para. 1 (Hans Dolle ed., 1976) with reference to examples that were used as a basis
in the working group. It is questionable, and with regards to the ULIS in this
context was never clear, whether a fundamental breach can even occur with a cur-
able defect (see section II, infra), so that the actual gravamen that permitted con-
tract avoidance in these cases was the failure to observe the fixed delivery times.
Exceeding fixed delivery dates by reason of an additional period to perform would
then have been the natural counterpart to failing to observe an additional period of
time for cure in Art. 44(2) ULIS.
10 See Huber, supra note 2, at art. 48, para. 5.
11 See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
on the Work of its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/75 (1973) regarding Article
44(2) ULIS (Nachfristmodell); see Progress Report of the Working Group on the
International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/62
& Adds. 1-2 (1972) regarding Article 43 ULIS. See also United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law 4 Y.B. 54, No.130-145 (1973) [hereinafter UNCI-
TRAL]. See Huber, supra note 2, at art. 48, para. 6 (regarding the reasons for the
[Vol. 18:83
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solution was already set out. Attempts remained unsuccessful
during the Vienna Conference to again introduce the model of
setting an additional period of time for performance (Nachfrist)
as to defective goods, and where there is a seller's offer to cure,
to presume a fundamental breach only when the cure would re-
quire going "materially" beyond the deadline (in other words,
practically the solution of Arts. 43 and 44(2) ULIS). 12
Despite the clear (though debatable) decision of the CISG
drafters, some legal writers maintained their reservations re-
garding the solution of the CISG and occasionally sought a way
out of the rigid union of avoidance with the threshold for funda-
mental breach in the CISG by reasoning that if the seller fails
to satisfactorily cure 13 when demanded by the buyer, then after
the expiration of a reasonable period of time, the breach should
be allowed to become a fundamental breach of contract.' 4
elimination, in particular as to the "paradox" of the ULIS provisions (consequently
abandoned by UNCITRAL) in setting further requirements such as lapsed delivery
times or an elapsed Nachfrist, even where there is a fundamental breach due to
lack of conformity).
12 See the proposals of the Netherlands and Canada, which were supported by
Germany:United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Vienna 10 March-11 April 1980, Official Records, A/CONF. 97/19, Art. 45,
Para. 3, No. 1-2, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/lstcommittee/summa-
ries49.html; Art. 45, Para. 67, 68, 71, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgt
firstcommittee/Meeting22.html. See also Huber,supra note 2, at art. 48, para. 9;
art. 49, para. 4; JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION para. 296 (1982) (interpreting the negotia-
tions in Vienna and their outcome such that the seller's offer to cure a lack of
conformity always has priority).
13 Under Article 46(2) of the CISG, the buyer can only demand delivery of
substitute goods if the non-conformity itself constitutes a fundamental breach. In
such a case, the buyer could also avoid the contract without demanding delivery of
substitute goods anyway. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available
at Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu. [hereinafter CISG].
14 See, e.g., Huber, supra note 2, at art. 45, para. 29 (Under Article 46(3), the
buyer can claim remedy by repair as well as compensation for all losses caused by
delay, and consequential and incidental losses: "If an attempt to cure fails or is not
carried out within a reasonable time, then that constitutes a renewed breach of
contract, which will be viewed as a fundamental breach even if the original breach
lacked sufficient substantiality to qualify as such.") See also Huber, supra note 2,
at art. 46, para. 60: "The second breach of contract, since it occurs after an existing
breach, is to be viewed as 'fundamental'... [tihe buyer is now entitled to declare the
contract avoided pursuant to Article 49(1)(a)."
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Both the rejection of the CISG's solution in Anglo-American
legal literature, and the apprehension of German jurists regard-
ing adherence to the contract despite the non-conformity of the
tendered goods, should serve as an opportunity to once again
take up the question of rejection of non-conforming goods and to
reconsider the issues.
II. NON-CONFORMITY OF THE GOODS TO THE CONTRACT
As FUNDAMENTAL
A. Breach and the Right of the Seller to Offer a Second
Tender
As briefly described in section I, the issue of prerequisites
for avoidance in the case of non-conforming goods is particularly
a problem of weighing the buyer's interest to get out of the con-
tract as easily as possible against the seller's interest to be able
to salvage the contract through a second tender. This is re-
flected in the struggle over a model for a delivery period and/or
an additional period of time (Nachfrist), as is evident in Articles
43 and 44(2) ULIS, in the working groups of UNCITRAL, and at
the Vienna Conference. In the preparation of the CISG, this
issue was repeatedly disputed and discussed with regard to the
right of a second tender, now set in Article 48 CISG. After the
CISG solution was finally established and the Convention en-
tered into effect, the discussion on this issue continued through
the interpretation of the words "subject to [Article 49" in Arti-
cle 48(1) CISG. This formulation suggested the interpretation
that the seller's right to offer a second tender provided in Article
48 CISG could be cut off by the buyer through a declaration of
avoidance if the lack of conformity itself represents a funda-
mental breach. The view already unsuccessfully presented at
the Vienna Conference, that there cannot be a fundamental
breach if the seller makes a sincere offer to cure which is possi-
ble within the agreed-upon delivery period (so that therefore
the antinomy between Article 48(1) and Article 49 CISG is only
apparent and not real), has prevailed today, 15 but was long dis-
15 See Urs Peter Gruber in MONCHNER KOMMENTAR art. 25, para. 25 (4th ed.
2004); Ulrich Magnus, Aufhebungsrecht des Kaufers und Nacherfillungsrecht des
Verkaufers im UN-Kaufrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER SCHLECHTRIEM 599-612
(2003). Magnus may be summarized on this point as follows: "With severe defects
in performance that the seller can easily remedy, dissolution of the contract may
[Vol. 18:83
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puted16 and does not quite correspond to the course of discus-
sions at UNCITRAL. A proposal there by the American delegate
John Honnold to bestow significance for purposes of a funda-
mental breach (and thereby the right of the buyer to avoid the
contract) on the seller's offer to cure, remained unsuccessful. 17
Such proposals also remained fruitless in the discussions at the
UN Conference in Vienna in 1980. Practically speaking, in
many cases this solution may be attained through the seller's
unequivocal and lasting offer to cure pursuant to the second
sentence of Article 48(2) CISG, which vitiates the need to settle
the dogmatic question of whether the seller's offer to cure pre-
vents the "fundamentality" of the breach or only blocks avoid-
ance (as with the subsequent performance of incompatible
remedies). However, the question remains if the buyer objects
to the seller's offer to cure.
The prevailing view today in the German legal literature"'
that a realistic offer of the seller to cure "prevents" immediate
avoidance is correct; but a constant reservation, though often
only casually mentioned, should be pointed out here: the offer to
cure must be performed within the fixed delivery time, or in any
case within a reasonable time, since otherwise the delay in per-
formance that conforms to the contract can itself turn into a
fundamental breach. A further requirement seems to be that
the lack of conformity itself (i.e., without a timely feasible cure)
only occur when the seller fails to use his chance to subsequently perform within a
reasonable time." Id. at 612. This corresponds to the solution advanced by Huber.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16 See Huber, supra note 2, at art. 48, paras. 7, 8. Compare id. at art. 46,
para. 65; art. 48, para 9 (stating that the suggestion that an offer to cure should be
considered in the interpretation of Article 25 CISG is "not to be followed") with id.
at art. 49, para. 27 (stating non-conformities capable of being remedied by reasona-
ble means "as a rule" do not yet constitute a fundamental breach).
17 See UNCITRAL 8 Y.B. 31, Nos. 93-96 (1977); UNCITRAL 8 Y.B. 45, Nos.
275-276. Honnold had suggested that a seller's reasonable offer to cure be in-
cluded in the definition of a fundamental breach (now Article 25 CISG) as an addi-
tional factor to be considered for determining materiality of the breach. Honnold
retained this view in the interpretation of the adopted version of the Convention.
See HONNOLD, supra note 12, paras. 184, 296.
18 See Schlechtriem COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at art. 25, para. 20; Christi-
ana Fountoulakis, Das VerhdItnis von Nacherfiullungsrecht des Verkdufers und
Vertragsaufhebungsrecht des Kaufers im UN-Kaufrecht INTERNATIONALES HANDEL-
SRECHT 160-169 (2003); Ulrich Magnus, Aufhebungsrecht des Kdufers und
NacherfUllungsrecht des Verkdufers im UN-Kaufrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT SCHLECH-
TRIEM 599-612 (2003) (with further citations at 601-02).
2006]
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would be so serious that it would constitute a fundamental
breach. In practice this amounts to the basic idea of Article 43
ULIS, but naturally without its "paradoxical"19 cumulation of
requirements for avoidance.
The development of the solutions outlined here regarding
the issue of conditions under which a contract can be avoided
due to non-conformity of the goods from the ULIS to the CISG,
in addition to the possibilities and alternatives vigorously dis-
cussed by the members of the working groups, by UNCITRAL,
and finally by the delegates of the Vienna UN Conference, as
well as various commentators and the interpretation uncertain-
ties regarding the relationship between Article 48(1) and Article
49 CISG, all show that apart from the weight of the respective
defect, a time factor has significant importance for the
avoidability of the contract. As long as the seller can cure a lack
of conformity by subsequent performance without exceeding
fixed delivery dates or deadlines, the seller's interest in a sec-
ond tender (within the qualifications of Article 48(1) CISG)
ought to be given priority. The occasionally advocated "reasona-
ble time" or the Nachfrist model for remedying a defect such as
in Article 44(2) ULIS or § 437(2) and § 323(1) BGB are mostly
important where the fixed character of the delivery time is un-
certain or, as with sales contracts between private individuals,
is infrequent and uncommon. For the time being, the "third in-
terest" of avoiding the cost and risks of undoing the transaction,
is disregarded here (see infra, section IV).
In practice, however, not much is gained with this concre-
tization of the time factor as a relevant element for avoidance.
Especially for commerce in markets with fluctuating prices,
where the buyer requires prompt certainty regarding further
action and the fate of the sales contract (and thereby the offered
goods), this merely offers the buyer stones rather than bread.
Moreover, an extension of time or Nachfristmodell, which,
against the clear intention of the CISG drafters (and thereby
the national legislative bodies that ratified the Convention),
could not be implanted as interpretation or gap-filler, would by
itself not always be helpful in the above-referenced segment of
commerce. However, one should consider whether there is not a
19 Huber, supra note 2, at art. 48, para. 6.
(Vol. 18:83
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useful solution to be found which would correspond to the direc-
tives of interpretation in Article 7(1) CISG or by means of a gap-
filler through recourse to principles of the Convention provided
in Article 7(2) CISG, that is practicable.
III. THE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT GOODS AS THE EXERCISE OF A
GENERAL RIGHT TO WITHHOLD PERFORMANCE
1. As mentioned above, the CISG does not recognize the
right of the buyer to reject non-conforming goods in a manner
directly corresponding to the Anglo-American rules. Rejection
rights, which are presupposed in Article 86(1) CISG, are pro-
vided for only in the instances set forth in Article 52 CISG (de-
livery before the date fixed, or delivery of a quantity greater
than that provided for in the contract). Otherwise, the position
taken in the legal literature is that the buyer can reject the
goods only when exercising the right to avoid the contract. 20
The buyer must therefore take delivery of defective goods as
well, unless he can avoid. Of course, in comparing the perfect
tender rule, whereby the buyer loses the right to avoid the con-
tract and treat it as discharged 21 if he does not reject non-con-
forming goods, one must consider that according to the
understanding of Anglo-American jurists, acceptance of non-
conforming goods is more than the mere physical taking deliv-
ery of the goods; rather, it is to be understood as "acceptance as
performance." Since the buyer "accepted as performance," he
can no longer reject on the basis of non-performance. However,
taking delivery under the CISG does not have this far-reaching
effect. The CISG does not require the severity of the perfect
tender rule and the possibility of rejecting non-conforming
goods in order to preserve the buyer's rights. Nevertheless, con-
cerns over such a solution, which forces the buyer to always
20 See Wolfgang Witz, Zuriickbehaltungsrechte im internationalen Kauf - Eine
praxisorienterte Analyse zur Durchsetzung des Kaufpreisanspruchs im CISG, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER SCHLECHTRIEM 291, 291 - 304 (Ingeborg Schwenzer &
Gunter Hagar eds, 2003); WOLFGANG WITZ ET AL., INTERNATIONAL EINHEITLICHES
KAUFRECHT: PRAKTIKER-KOMMENTAR UND VERTRAGSGESTALTUNG ZUM CISG, art.
60, para. 10 (2000) (unlimited recognition of a right of rejection would contradict
the general principle that avoidance of the contract require a fundamental breach;
if necessary, the buyer must avoid the contract or demand delivery of substitute
goods).
21 See Mullis, supra note 4, at 332.
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take delivery of non-conforming goods unless the high and pos-
sibly uncertain threshold of a fundamental breach is reached
and the buyer timely declares avoidance before the acceptance"
(the effectiveness of which might only be resolved much later in
a lawsuit over the fundamental nature" of the non-conformity of
the goods), are understandable. 22 Such a solution has properly
been criticized as insufficient for commerce with goods of fluctu-
ating prices, in particular for the international commodities
trade (raw materials, but also finished goods such as memory
chips, etc.).
2. It is questionable, however, whether the buyer really is
required to take delivery of non-conforming goods, and whether
he always breaches a duty by refusing to do so. Although the
CISG contains no general rule regarding the right of withhold-
ing or retaining one's performance, it may be presumed today as
the prevailing view that, pursuant to Article 7(2) CISG, such a
right can be developed as a gap-filler from a general principle
upon which a series of provisions of the CISG are based.23 Such
a right can also counter the seller's demand that the buyer take
delivery of the goods, to which the buyer is obligated under Arti-
cles 53 and 60.24 A justified refusal to take delivery based on
such a right to withhold performance means first of all only that
the buyer has not thereby breached the contract. Thus, if the
buyer had the obligation to pick up the goods, the buyer is not
required to fetch them, and if the seller had the obligation to
deliver the goods, upon their arrival the buyer must only take
steps to preserve them (and perhaps take them into possession
22 In light of the numerous cases in which the "materiality" of a breach was
not "clarified" until having reached a court of last instance, the demand that the
fundamental nature of the breach be "immediately determinable and then remain
so fixed" (Huber, supra note 2, at art. 46, para. 65), is hardly realistic.
23 See Witz in FESTSCHRIFT SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 20; Peter Schlechtriem,
CISG - Auslegung, LUickenfiillung und Weiterentwicklung, Address at a Sympo-
sium in Honor of Frank Vischer (May 11, 2004), English version in 16 PACE INT'L
L. REV. 279, 279-306 (2004), available at http://cisg-online.ch/cisg/Schlechtriem-
SymposiumVischer.pdf; see also Kantonsgericht Appenzell Ausserrhoden [KG]
[Court of the Canton of Appenzell] Mar. 10, 2003, Proz, Nr. 433/02 (Switz), availa-
ble at http://www.CISG-online.ch No. 852 = IHR 2004, 254-256 (English version
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030310sl.html) (withholding the pay-
ment of the price as long as the seller is in default as to his obligation to set a date
for the buyer to collect the goods).
24 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 5, supra note 4, at 4.18-4.21; Schlechtriem, supra
note 23, at sub. II, para. 5.
[Vol. 18:83
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for preservation) pursuant to Article 86 CISG, as in the case of
rejection due to delivery of a quantity greater than that pro-
vided for in the contract, delivery before the date fixed, or avoid-
ance of the contract. This course of action also regularly
prevents liability after the risk of loss has passed, since pursu-
ant to Article 66 CISG the buyer's non-acceptance is due to con-
duct of the seller (tender of non-conforming goods). 25
Of course, the right to withhold (or to retain) one's perform-
ance can also counter the seller's claim for payment of the sales
price.26 The state of uncertainty regarding the contract's imple-
mentation, which is produced by the assertion of the right of
retention, can only last until the buyer has decided what rem-
edy he both desires and can claim: thus, pursuant to Article
49(2)(b) CISG for a reasonable time or, if the buyer can demand
a cure pursuant to Article 46(2) or (3) CISG, for the additional
period fixed in accordance with Article 47(1) CISG. Upon the
expiration of such time limits, the right to withhold perform-
ance lapses and the refusal to take delivery or pay the price be-
comes a breach of contract. The state of uncertainty existing
until the expiration of a reasonable time can also be terminated
by a second tender that conforms to the contract, as long as
fixed delivery dates have not already passed. Article 48(2) and
(3) CISG provide the seller in this situation the additional possi-
bility to give notice of a second tender and thereby block the
buyer from declaring the contract avoided for the duration of a
reasonable time, which however, cannot exceed fixed delivery
dates. Independent from Article 46 CISG and the limitations
regarding the buyer's demands for cure set in paragraphs (2)
and (3) of that article, the seller is free in the form of his cure.
3. The justified (and time limited) refusal to accept goods
as the exercise of a general right to withhold performance can
lead to fixed times for delivery being exceeded and thereby caus-
ing a fundamental breach that would permit avoidance of the
contract. Thus, if the seller has not timely cured in a manner
that conforms to the contract, the buyer can now declare the
contract avoided for failure to meet a fixed deadline, without
determining whether the non-conformity itself represents a fun-
25 See Guinter Hager in COMMENTARY ON THE CISG, supra note 3, at art. 66,
para. 5.
26 Schlechtriem, supra note 23, at sub. II, para. 5(c).
2006]
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damental breach (which might otherwise necessitate a long liti-
gation or arbitration of uncertain outcome). In commerce with
goods where fixed deadlines are common, this practically leads
to a result corresponding to the perfect tender rule.
IV. COSTS AND RISKS OF UNDOING THE TRANSACTION
The solution suggested in section III, which is a continua-
tion of earlier deliberations, 27 must face the argument that its
result leads to a further development of the CISG, which partly
corrects the views of its drafters and which neglects the third
interest viewpoint introduced at the beginning of this article,
which was influential in the decision of the CISG drafters that,
due to the costs and risks associated with undoing a transac-
tion, contract avoidance should be prevented as best as possible.
Thus, we must examine the importance of this argument, and if
need be, scrutinize earlier views taken on the subject.28
First we must recall that in a comparative analysis of cases
from the courts of the Contracting States and from arbitration
tribunals, the severity of the German Supreme Court in judging
when a lack of conformity is to be viewed as a fundamental
breach can certainly not be considered an international stan-
dard.29 This alone should caution against overvaluing the pre-
requisites for avoidance with references to the costs and risks of
returning the goods. However, for other reasons as well it is not
always valid in every case:
1. The argument that additional costs and risks associated
with the necessary return shipment of the goods and their pos-
sible interim storage must be avoided, can only have signifi-
cance if the goods have already been delivered to the buyer (or
at least brought to the carrier) or have been placed in storage.
If, however, the buyer goes to collect the goods himself, discov-
ers a lack of conformity and therefore refuses acceptance, such
costs and risks do not arise, or at least not always to such a
degree that requires hindrance of unwinding the contract
27 See Schlechtriem, supra note 23; PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, INTERNATIONALES
UN-KAUFRECHT para. 188, n.132 (2d ed. 2003).
28 Schlechtriem COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at art. 25, para. 21a.
29 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 5, supra note 4, at 4.1-4.21, and citations in An-
nex 1.
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through imposition of a high threshold for avoidance. 30 The sit-
uation is similar with anticipatory repudiation and the decision
of whether the seller will commit a fundamental breach under
Article 72(1) CISG. If before the time for delivery it is clear that
the seller will not be able to deliver goods that conform to the
contract, then the reason for an elevated threshold for avoid-
ance cannot be because costs and risks of a return shipment of
the goods must be prevented, since such costs and risks do not
even arise. The same applies in the case of installment deliv-
eries still due and a corresponding avoidance of the contract
pursuant to Article 73(2) CISG: if the first deliveries are defec-
tive, one cannot use the cost and risk element of undoing the
transaction to argue for a high materiality threshold for the an-
ticipated breaches (i.e., the installment deliveries still due). If
the sold goods are warehoused, or to be delivered by ship or mo-
tor vehicle, then new arrangements can be made before delivery
to the buyer so that these additional costs will not necessarily
arise or will not increase to such an extent to be much higher
than those when return shipping is required. A significant risk
increase would be an exception rather than the rule.
2. If the buyer takes possession of the goods elsewhere
than at the seller's place of business, then avoidance need not
necessarily involve return shipping, since for avoidance the
same must apply as for the exercise of the right of rejection
before acceptance: the buyer is under a duty to preserve the
goods under Article 86 CISG. However, the buyer can often re-
sort to a self-help sale of the goods at their location pursuant to
Article 88 CISG, so that at least return shipping costs are
spared and corresponding risks are avoided. Also, if the buyer
seeks to recover damages, a cover sale at the location of the
goods can be desirable to mitigate losses.31
3. (a) Indeed, costs and risks associated with the return
transport of non-conforming goods that have already been
30 For reasoning against a special evaluation of these cases, see CISG-AC
Opinion No. 5, supra note 4, at 4.6.
31 In numerous references by the courts regarding the justification of preserv-
ing the sales contract, it is stated that the buyer can and must use or liquidate the
non-conforming goods, if need be at throw-away prices. Apart from avoiding the
contract, the buyer must be allowed to do that if the proceeds from the liquidation
of the non-conforming goods at their location are higher than the costs to return
them.
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shipped to the buyer can be considerable. However, there are
instances where return shipment to the seller and disposition of
the goods in an exporting country can even work to reduce
losses in comparison with an "emergency sale" in an importing
country. If the goods are non-conforming (only) because they do
not meet public law safety standards of the importing country
and are consequently unusable and unmarketable there,3 2 but
in the exporting country of the seller the goods are acceptable,
then avoidance of the contract and shipment of the goods back
to the seller can possibly reduce the net loss from the transac-
tion and thus be advisable. Nevertheless, often the situation
will be different: such as when the goods in question are ma-
chines or high quality electronic wares vulnerable to theft and
delivered to a country with an insufficient shipping and ware-
house infrastructure. The organization of cargo space for the
return shipment to the seller, rail or road transport to the port
of discharge, interim storage, etc., can all be expensive and haz-
ardous, such that, in fact, it seems economically advisable to
preserve the contract and to satisfy the buyer's interest with
damages and/or a reduction in the price. However, in such
cases there may be no possibility for use of the non-conforming
goods in the buyer's country at all, so that also under the strict
criteria of the German Supreme Court a fundamental breach
would exist and avoidance would be consequently permissible.
Therefore, the transaction might still come undone.
(b) The costs of return shipping, etc., are generally ascribed
to the seller as foreseeable consequential damages from his
breach of contract.33 Exemption under Article 79(1) or (2) CISG
would hardly ever be applicable. However, after avoidance the
buyer is responsible for the preservation of the goods, and any
deterioration or loss of the goods should be judged pursuant to
32 On the disputed question of whether public law regulations in the import-
ing land or exporting land control, see Ingeborg Schwenzer in COMMENTARY, ON
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 3,
at art. 35, paras. 17-18.
33 See Rainer Hornung in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE IN-
TERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 3, at art. 81, para. 19 [hereinafter
Hornung COMMENTARY]. See also the clear reasoning regarding foreseeability of
transport costs (chartering and re-chartering a ship) that arose as a consequence of
a party avoiding a contract due to the other party's refusal to perform in Downs
Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Perwaja Steel (2001) 2 Q.R. 462 (Austl.), at http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/011012a2.html.
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Articles 74 and 79 CISG.34 Passage of the risk of loss (if, de-
spite the seller's breach, the risk even should have passed 35 and
the purchase price has already been paid), is determined in ac-
cordance with Articles 66- 70 CISG. For such purposes one
must first resolve where and how the buyer is to perform his
obligation of restitution.36 For example, if the buyer (who is
under a duty to restore the goods) delivers the goods to be re-
turned to a carrier, and if the goods are then damaged or de-
stroyed in transit, the buyer can still reclaim the purchase price
through corresponding application of Articles 66 and 67(1)
CISG.
(c) Regardless of who must bear the costs and risks, the
total expenses of the transaction increase in such situations,
which can be viewed as economically wasteful. In such cases, it
seems sensible and even advisable to make avoidance of the
contract more difficult. But the question must be permitted,
whether the buyer's interest in being able to return non-con-
forming goods should be placed behind the economic interest in
minimizing the costs of failed transactions. Generally, the
breaching seller bears these costs as a consequence of his deliv-
ery of non-conforming goods.37 To the extent the buyer is re-
sponsible for risks and costs, such as the risk of liability for
return of the goods, and possibly the risk for the return of the
purchase price, the buyer assumed such costs and risks with his
choice of "avoidance" as a remedy and considered (or at least
should have considered) this choice against other remedies. In
the allocation of such burdens, their prevention should not be
forced upon the buyer through the denial of avoidance of the
contract with the argument of a (perhaps) economically sensible
reduction in costs.
All things considered, the argument that avoidance of the
contract carries costs and risks due to the necessity of returning
the goods, and that therefore in the case of non-conforming
34 See Hornung COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at art. 82, para. 13.
35 See text above at section 111.2.; Exceptions considered are those in which
the seller neither caused the lack of conformity of the goods nor is responsible for
it.
36 Details regarding these questions that are not settled in the CISG will not
be dealt with here; see Hornung COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at art. 81, paras. 17-
18b.
37 See Hornung COMMENTARY, supra note 33.
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goods, avoidance should be restricted as much as possible,
seems incorrect in many situations. Moreover, such an argu-
ment seems rather unconvincing, and fails to persuade that the
right of avoidance based on lapsed delivery deadlines, exercised
through a justified refusal of acceptance as described herein,
should be rejected too.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss1/3
